The other day, as I walked through our family room, Barack Obama came on the 52 inch flat screen in high def clarity. After I rose from my genuflection, I tried to understand what His Nibs is saying about the now universally acclaimed surge strategy in Iraq.
I think he said that it was obvious that it would work (a no brainer; no credit due McCain on that)but that he opposed it - and still would have opposed it - because he disagreed with the Bush administration.
When His disciples heard this, many of them said, This is a hard and difficult and strange saying. Who can stand to hear it?
What does it mean? I knew it would work but I didn't want it to? I knew it would work but I don't think that success in Iraq is important? I knew it would work but we still can't win in Iraq so we should leave without regard to the situation on the ground?
The lefty blogs are all a twitter about a statement by John McCain that seems to suggest that the Anbar Awakening (which they want to define as a tribal accord) happened after the surge. It didn't. But what McCain seems to be saying is that the surge created the space for the Sunni turn against al-Qaeda to be successful.
McCain supported the surge. Obama opposed it. If, in fact, it is now possible to withdraw most American troops from Iraq without the disastrous consequences that the Irag Study Group thought were inevitable and that Obama was prepared to accept (and maybe even with sixteen months of the inauguration of the next President), it is because of a policy that McCain supported and Obama opposed. Obama would have let Iraq go to hell in a hand basket, arguing that there was no alternative. No, we can't, he would have said.
But we did.
Jonah Goldberg argues that this doesn't matter. The surge has been so successful that it takes Iraq off the table as an issue and this hurts McCain because his natural advantage is on foreign policy and national security. The American people, he argues, already believe that McCain is better suited to be commander-in-chief. McCain's challenge, according to Jonah, is to convince Americans that is what they need.
But history tells us that, when it comes to the Presidency, that is precisely what we need.
11 comments:
the now universally acclaimed surge strategy in Iraq
Since I've read plenty of pundits who deplore the moderately successful strategy of paying insurgents millions of dollars not to attack U.S. troops and calling this a "surge", I doubt that this triumphal rhetoric has much to recommend it.
As for the unbelievable mental contortions required to look at Iraq -- invasion supported by McCain -- and somehow extract a positive spin point for the role of a Bush cheerleader from what history teaches, of all things... well, he is the Republican candidate, and I suppose you have to find something or other to say about him. It can't all be "Obama reminds of Stalin," right?
Whatever the yahoo above me is referring to aside. . .
If I were the President, I would give Senator Obama a little lesson in Constitutional Law 101 (an extremely public lesson). I have not ready any passage in the Constitution that would permit either a candidate, or a single U.S. Senator, to dictate foreign policy on behalf of the United States.
If I were the President, I would give Senator Obama a little lesson in Constitutional Law
Senator Obama has taught constitutional law at the University of Chicago. Our current president has as much regard for the constitution as he does for a napkin. There is a good argument for an executive branch constitutional refresher course, but the roles would be reversed.
a statement by John McCain that seems to suggest that the Anbar Awakening... happened after the surge
There was no suggestion there. McCain couldn't have been clearer. "I don't know how you respond to something that is such a false depiction of what actually happened. Colonel McFarlane (phonetic) was contacted by one of the major Sunni sheiks. Because of the surge we were able to go out and protect that sheik and others. And it began the Anbar awakening. I mean, that's just a matter of history." He is flat out wrong about the course of events. He either doesn't understand or is lying about the impact of our troop deployment. How can you trust this guy as the commander in chief?
When you couple this gaffe with his comments about Al Qaeda being trained in Iran it is troubling. Does this guy really have a firm grasp of the dynamics at play in the middle east?
Does this guy really have a firm grasp of the dynamics at play in the middle east?
Well, he must have a better grasp than Obama because he supported the successful policy that Obama opposed. Certainly, the Sunni turn against al-Qaeda - which Petraeus exploited - began before the surge, but it continued and expanded after the surge and was abetted by it. They are complemenary, not independent events. Had we done what the Dems and Obama wanted to do back then - announce that we were out, it likely wouldn't have happened or not been successful.
McCain's statement - in using a specific term that people use to refer to a pre-surge event - had that chronology wrong, but he is right to suggest that the surge abetted and made possible what grew into the Iraq awakening.
Jumping all over this is a "gotcha" that is designed to divert attention from the fact that McCain had it right and Obama had it wrong.
OTOH, I think Goldberg's analysis has traction. Since Iraq has been off the front pages, Iraq-as-an-issue is fading (except to the fanatic anti-war crowd.)
The pocketbook determines election victories, with very few exceptions, Rick.
And you can bet that the Bad Guys will hold their fire until O takes office (should that happen.) They understand propaganda as well as anyone.
Juan Cole is worth a read on the question of the impact of the surge. As he explains, it's first necessary to accurately define the surge, which was an increase from 120,000 to 150,000 troops, in order to get at the impact.
From there, Cole concludes: "The troop escalation in and of itself was probably not that consequential. That the troops [i.e., not just the new ones] were used in new ways by Gen. Petraeus was more important. But their main effect was ironic. They calmed Baghdad down by accidentally turning it into a Shiite city, as Shiite as Isfahan or Tehran, and thus a terrain on which the Sunni Arab guerrilla movement could not hope to fight effectively."
The important point here, of course, is that the ultimate goal of the surge was a militarily and politically stable Iraq, but simply ridding Baghdad of much of its Sunni population doesn't satisfy the latter part of that goal. And here we are 18 months after the start of the surge -- and even longer since the US started paying off Sunnis to stay quiet -- with scant evidence of political reconciliation; and, the fact remains, as long as the US stays in the country with its thumb militarily and monetarily pressing down on one of the sides, evidence of true reconciliation will remain just that -- scant.
As for McCain, I'd say Steve Chapman gets it about right: "What McCain omits is that if he himself had been right all the times before 2007 that he said things were going fine, no surge would have been needed. He's like a weatherman who forecasts clear skies every day [which you can watch here] and, when the rain finally lets up after a week, expects a standing ovation for his accuracy."
Juan Cole's post, to which Seth cites approvingly, is determinedly agnostic as to whether the surge was worth it. (The result, Cole says, was ethnic cleansing of Sunnis with a heightened prospect of war when they eventually re-assert themselves; and yet, he concedes that "Security in Iraq is demonstrably improved, for whatever reason.")
But given the improved scene, "for whatever reason," Cole wants US troops out of Iraq. As does Obama, but he wants them transferred to Afghanistan. So, a surge that Cole (and, I presume, Seth) doubts worked in Iraq will now be tried elsewhere. I wonder if Seth approves Obama's plan.
As I stated, William: "The important point here, of course, is that the ultimate goal of the surge was a militarily and politically stable Iraq, but simply ridding Baghdad of much of its Sunni population doesn't satisfy the latter part of that goal."
So you can focus on improved security all you want, but, as Cole points out, when it comes without significant political improvement, it's a shallow victory.
As for getting troops out, as I also stated, "as long as the US stays in the country with its thumb militarily and monetarily pressing down on one of the sides, evidence of true reconciliation will remain just that -- scant."
There are no good options in Iraq; but putting an end date on the US presence is the best one for realizing political reconciliation, and it's clear the Maliki government agrees.
In terms of Afghanistan, I'm skeptical of Obama's plan to add 7,000-10,000 more troops, and Cole is more than skeptical; ultimately, I think the aspects of Obama's Afghanistan plan that involve developmental aid and attention to resolving the problem of poppy cultivation will be more useful. But at least Obama is honest about the fact that sending more troops into Afghanistan will require removing troops from Iraq; McCain wants to have his cake and eat it, too (and that goes for his "balanced budget" plan, as well).
Juan Cole's post, to which Seth cites approvingly, is determinedly agnostic as to whether the surge was worth it.
One more point here, one of the major goals of Cole's post was the clearly define the surge, which was plainly the addition of 30K more troops into Iraq. Now McCain is feverishly trying to make other counterinsurgency activities a part of that -- activities like quieting Sunnis by clearing them out of Baghdad or paying them off, which is what Cole says has helped the security in the country -- but that's just not accurate. So whether the surge was "worth it" even in just a military sense is entirely dependent on how you define it, and the fact that McCain is now getting pretty fast and loose with his definition is evidence of that.
But this is why I think this is a game of "gotcha." Let's define the Sunni awakening and the surge as a particular points in time so we can see that McCain doesn't understand what's going on.
The fact of the matter is that US troops exploited Sunni dissatisfaction with al-Qaeda and supported it with additional troops. It is quite clear that McCain understands that whether or not he misplaced Anbar in the chronology or sees the surge as part and parcel of a broader counterinsurgency approach that began earlier.
That strategy has been militarily successful and, contra Seth, there has been substantial political progress. Obama has had to change his rhetoric (we can leave because we are winning and can now send more troops to Afghanistan).
Everyone agrees that we are on our way to withdrawal. But pressing for a clear date - rather than withdrawing as facts on the ground permit - is a political ploy, not a responsible strategy.
As far as Chapman goes, McCain had been pushing for a change in strategy for quite some time.
It is certainly true that if we had, with Obama, not gone into Iraq, the casualties associated with the Iraq war would not have happened. But a complete counterfactual would have to take into account the impact of leaving Saddam in power and the almost certain collapse of the sanctions regime.
The fact of the matter is that US troops exploited Sunni dissatisfaction with al-Qaeda and supported it with additional troops.
I'd say casting the surge in a supporting role in the improved security situation in Iraq is closer to the reality; but, at best, that brings into question whether the 30K extra troops were necessary for the improved situation, or if the real security changes are due -- as Cole convincingly argues -- to the way troops were used, among the other counterinsurgency tactics like bribing Sunni Arab former insurgents to fight radical Sunni vigilantes. And the fact is the McCain camp is so dependent upon public view of the surge that it wants to grossly expand its scope in order to cover for the fact that troop increase from 120K to 150K, in itself, didn't do much.
That strategy has been militarily successful and, contra Seth, there has been substantial political progress.
Forgive me if I don't put a ton of stock in a White House report, let alone one that hides behind meeting self-defined "satisfactory" progress toward benchmarks as opposed to assessments of whether the benchmarks have actually been met. That, to me, makes your use of the phrase "substantial political progress" highly dubious, to say the least.
But pressing for a clear date - rather than withdrawing as facts on the ground permit - is a political ploy, not a responsible strategy.
No, it's a response to the reality that political reconciliation won't come until an end date is placed on the US presence, and that's why the Maliki government supports it. Of course flexibility should play a role, and I wish Obama would've emphasized that more during the primary (it upsets me that the Dem base wasn't more flexible on the issue of flexibility in the past couple of years), but the emphasis still needs to be on ending the US presence.
As far as Chapman goes, McCain had been pushing for a change in strategy for quite some time.
He was pushing to stay the course for a lot longer; all the relevant footage, placed in handy chronological order, is here.
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